France/Tunisia: The New Situation
31 January 2011
Read by 1429 persons
Tunisia is now part of a democratization process, the form and strength of which are revolutionary. Through an act of sovereignty, its people decided to take their destiny into their own hands and break the social contract that bound them to the Ben Ali regime. This event marks the beginning of a new chapter in the country's history. It also opens new perspectives for the peoples of the region. The authoritarianism that characterizes Arab regimes is affected by the shockwave of this popular revolution, which further strengthens citizens' distrust of their rulers.
The new Tunisian situation upsets the analytical frameworks and paradigms on which the French perception of the Arab world in general and the Maghreb in particular was based. France did not know - or did not want to - grasp this acceleration of history. It is not alone, far from it. However, the autism and wait-and-see attitude of the Élysée, combined with the blunders of Michèle Alliot-Marie, have created a profound malaise. An alternative to the Ben Ali system seemed inconceivable to French diplomacy. The silence of the former colonial power was more akin to tacit support for the old regime than benevolent neutrality towards the Tunisian people, this "brother people" - according to Nicolas Sarkozy's expression - who seemed condemned to the insurmountable horizon of "Benalism".
A credibility problem
The President of the Republic stated during the press conference held on January 24 that the French authorities had "not taken the right measure" of the Tunisian people's "despair". The problem would therefore be cognitive and analytical. This type of argument is not convincing. This is evidenced by the recent statements of Yves Aubin de la Messuzière, the former French ambassador to Tunisia (2002-2005), which show that the French executive was well aware of the corrupt and mafia-like nature of the regime. In reality, it is less the Quai d'Orsay's analytical capacity that is at issue than the strategic options of French diplomacy. These choices, tinged with a certain cynicism, are at the origin of an uncompromising policy of support for the regime.
To justify its diplomatic errors, Nicolas Sarkozy considered that "the President of France must take into account the weight of history in these countries. Colonial power is always illegitimate to pronounce judgment on a country. I claim a certain reserve when it comes to commenting on events in countries that were France and are no longer. I refuse that France be assimilated to a country that has retained colonial reflexes". This second argument also does not hold, unless we admit incoherence and contradiction as lines of conduct. Indeed, the reading grid proposed by the President of the Republic is not verified in the case of Côte d'Ivoire: head of state of the former colonial power, Nicolas Sarkozy did not hesitate to express his preference for one of the candidates in the presidential election, before expressing - vehemently - his desire to see Laurent Gbagbo leave power. An obvious act of interference and contradictory to the argumentation developed to justify his silence in the case of Tunisia.
Franco-American competition
In itself, the new regime that will emerge from the Tunisian "revolution" will be accompanied by a reconstruction of relations between the two states. Within these bilateral relations, France's Tunisian policy relied too much on slogans - such as the famous "Tunisian miracle" - and on a fallacious argument: the Ben Ali regime is the only bulwark against Islamism. The deconstruction of this type of discourse is the price to pay to rebuild the privileged link with this "brother people". Especially since France's voice is more than ever competed with by that of the United States.
In addition to the role the United States would have played in Ben Ali's departure, President Obama used the annual State of the Union address to salute the Tunisian people, whose "will (...) proved stronger than the grip of a dictator". It is true that he finds in the Tunisian revolution a point of support for his discourse of openness to the Muslim world. In this sense, the Tunisian precedent will undoubtedly have an echo during the next American presidential campaign, when Obama will have to defend the record of his foreign policy. As early as January 24, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, arrived in Tunisia for talks with officials from the transitional government, political leaders, and representatives of civil society. This visit aimed to "convey the support of the United States to the Tunisian people" and to take stock of the transition to determine how the United States can be helpful. He said that the Obama administration could thus provide assistance to the democratic transition, including through its expertise in electoral engineering in preparation for upcoming elections.
As Tunisia's main trading partner, France is trying to react to preserve its strategic interests and privileged relations with its former protectorate. By what means? President Sarkozy thus pledged to be at the forefront in defending Tunisia's candidacy to become an advanced partner of the European Union. Tunisia and the European Union (EU), already linked by an association agreement, launched negotiations in May 2010 to strengthen their relations, with a view to an "advanced status" to be granted by the EU. Recognition of such a status - which Morocco currently enjoys - would intensify political dialogue and trade relations between Brussels and Tunis to promote employment, good economic governance, and the modernization of justice.
France's desire to rebuild these bilateral relations on partially renewed bases is symbolized by the appointment of a new French ambassador to Tunisia: Boris Boillon, former advisor to President Nicolas Sarkozy and ambassador to Baghdad since May 2009. This man of confidence of the head of state will be tasked with reorganizing the French embassy, consolidating strategic and commercial relations between the two states, and establishing a privileged link with the future leadership team. Will this team make France pay for its attitude during the popular revolution that led to its accession to power? While any "freezing" of relations with France would not be in the interest of the Tunisian state, the people, for their part, may long remember the silence maintained by the former colonial power.
Finally, the reconfiguration of relations between the two shores of the Mediterranean is likely to relaunch or, on the contrary, further curb the Union for the Mediterranean. In this sense, the future of this political project is now linked to the destiny of the Tunisian Revolution.
Published January 31, 2011
Posted online January 31, 2011
affaires-strategiques.info
The new Tunisian situation upsets the analytical frameworks and paradigms on which the French perception of the Arab world in general and the Maghreb in particular was based. France did not know - or did not want to - grasp this acceleration of history. It is not alone, far from it. However, the autism and wait-and-see attitude of the Élysée, combined with the blunders of Michèle Alliot-Marie, have created a profound malaise. An alternative to the Ben Ali system seemed inconceivable to French diplomacy. The silence of the former colonial power was more akin to tacit support for the old regime than benevolent neutrality towards the Tunisian people, this "brother people" - according to Nicolas Sarkozy's expression - who seemed condemned to the insurmountable horizon of "Benalism".
A credibility problem
The President of the Republic stated during the press conference held on January 24 that the French authorities had "not taken the right measure" of the Tunisian people's "despair". The problem would therefore be cognitive and analytical. This type of argument is not convincing. This is evidenced by the recent statements of Yves Aubin de la Messuzière, the former French ambassador to Tunisia (2002-2005), which show that the French executive was well aware of the corrupt and mafia-like nature of the regime. In reality, it is less the Quai d'Orsay's analytical capacity that is at issue than the strategic options of French diplomacy. These choices, tinged with a certain cynicism, are at the origin of an uncompromising policy of support for the regime.
To justify its diplomatic errors, Nicolas Sarkozy considered that "the President of France must take into account the weight of history in these countries. Colonial power is always illegitimate to pronounce judgment on a country. I claim a certain reserve when it comes to commenting on events in countries that were France and are no longer. I refuse that France be assimilated to a country that has retained colonial reflexes". This second argument also does not hold, unless we admit incoherence and contradiction as lines of conduct. Indeed, the reading grid proposed by the President of the Republic is not verified in the case of Côte d'Ivoire: head of state of the former colonial power, Nicolas Sarkozy did not hesitate to express his preference for one of the candidates in the presidential election, before expressing - vehemently - his desire to see Laurent Gbagbo leave power. An obvious act of interference and contradictory to the argumentation developed to justify his silence in the case of Tunisia.
Franco-American competition
In itself, the new regime that will emerge from the Tunisian "revolution" will be accompanied by a reconstruction of relations between the two states. Within these bilateral relations, France's Tunisian policy relied too much on slogans - such as the famous "Tunisian miracle" - and on a fallacious argument: the Ben Ali regime is the only bulwark against Islamism. The deconstruction of this type of discourse is the price to pay to rebuild the privileged link with this "brother people". Especially since France's voice is more than ever competed with by that of the United States.
In addition to the role the United States would have played in Ben Ali's departure, President Obama used the annual State of the Union address to salute the Tunisian people, whose "will (...) proved stronger than the grip of a dictator". It is true that he finds in the Tunisian revolution a point of support for his discourse of openness to the Muslim world. In this sense, the Tunisian precedent will undoubtedly have an echo during the next American presidential campaign, when Obama will have to defend the record of his foreign policy. As early as January 24, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, arrived in Tunisia for talks with officials from the transitional government, political leaders, and representatives of civil society. This visit aimed to "convey the support of the United States to the Tunisian people" and to take stock of the transition to determine how the United States can be helpful. He said that the Obama administration could thus provide assistance to the democratic transition, including through its expertise in electoral engineering in preparation for upcoming elections.
As Tunisia's main trading partner, France is trying to react to preserve its strategic interests and privileged relations with its former protectorate. By what means? President Sarkozy thus pledged to be at the forefront in defending Tunisia's candidacy to become an advanced partner of the European Union. Tunisia and the European Union (EU), already linked by an association agreement, launched negotiations in May 2010 to strengthen their relations, with a view to an "advanced status" to be granted by the EU. Recognition of such a status - which Morocco currently enjoys - would intensify political dialogue and trade relations between Brussels and Tunis to promote employment, good economic governance, and the modernization of justice.
France's desire to rebuild these bilateral relations on partially renewed bases is symbolized by the appointment of a new French ambassador to Tunisia: Boris Boillon, former advisor to President Nicolas Sarkozy and ambassador to Baghdad since May 2009. This man of confidence of the head of state will be tasked with reorganizing the French embassy, consolidating strategic and commercial relations between the two states, and establishing a privileged link with the future leadership team. Will this team make France pay for its attitude during the popular revolution that led to its accession to power? While any "freezing" of relations with France would not be in the interest of the Tunisian state, the people, for their part, may long remember the silence maintained by the former colonial power.
Finally, the reconfiguration of relations between the two shores of the Mediterranean is likely to relaunch or, on the contrary, further curb the Union for the Mediterranean. In this sense, the future of this political project is now linked to the destiny of the Tunisian Revolution.
Published January 31, 2011
Posted online January 31, 2011
affaires-strategiques.info
